China's plans to build a 'mega embassy' near the Tower of London have sparked political concerns, but British spies have a different perspective. While politicians worry, the espionage community quietly reassures that the fears are overblown and misguided.
The UK's domestic Security Service, MI5, sees the consolidation of China's seven diplomatic sites into one as a welcome development. However, the real game-changer is the evolution of technology and the nature of the Chinese threat. As one former British intelligence officer puts it, 'Embassies are becoming less significant in the espionage game.'
Traditionally, spies have operated from diplomatic outposts, disguised as officials or trade envoys. China's new embassy complex at Royal Mint Court is expected to employ over 200 people, all Chinese nationals, including a few undeclared officers from its Ministry of State Security and military intelligence. These officers, according to a former MI6 officer, will act as 'radars,' identifying potential contacts and gathering intelligence, which is standard practice.
But here's the twist: conducting serious espionage from within the embassy walls is challenging. Why? Because embassies are high-profile targets for surveillance. A single site, as officials argue, simplifies surveillance, enabling MI5 to monitor Chinese officials' activities across the UK if required.
Moreover, the psychological impact of embassy monitoring is more subtle than the tactics used by China and Russia in their own countries. British diplomats in Beijing or Moscow operate under the assumption of constant digital surveillance. John Foreman, a former UK defense attaché to Moscow, describes the experience: 'You assume your life is not private.'
Foreman recalls conversations with his counterpart in Beijing, both trying to determine who was under more surveillance. In Moscow, he was constantly tailed, whether on foot or by car, with the number of agents varying based on his role as a defense attaché.
Russian agents employed tactics like pointing hidden listening devices at people in cafes. They tracked movements through phone apps, finding people faster if they used Russian apps instead of Google. The goal was to intimidate and pressure individuals, affecting their judgment. Some diplomats became so intimidated that they refused to leave the embassy, playing into the hands of the host country.
Opponents of the Chinese embassy project argue that its size is a significant issue. Luke de Pulford, from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, claims that more state employees from China means more interference, citing the US closure of a Chinese consulate in Houston in 2020 due to alleged intellectual property theft and coercion of Chinese citizens.
The US accused the Houston consulate of planning to steal medical research during the coronavirus pandemic. However, the UK's experience with espionage incidents suggests otherwise. China's key intelligence operations are not run from embassies. Beijing's hacking of global phone networks in the Salt Typhoon episode and its pressure on Sheffield Hallam University researchers were both orchestrated from within China.
Recent attempts by China to influence the Westminster parliament, such as the cases of Christine Lee, Christopher Cash, and recruitment consultants Amanda Qiu and Shirly Shen, were all conducted outside embassy walls. These incidents highlight that the embassy is just a fraction of the espionage threat from China, and the UK needs to be vigilant about the true sources of danger.
And this is the part most people miss: the espionage community's perspective challenges the political narrative, raising questions about the real nature of the threat and where the focus should lie. Are embassies the primary concern, or is the threat more dispersed and digital? It's a controversial interpretation, but one that invites a deeper discussion on national security.
